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Abstract
In South Africa, marriage rates among white women aged 20 to 34 are at least twice as
high as marriage rates among African women in the same age cohort. This paper compares
the relationship between alternative deﬁnitions of sex ratios and marriage outcomes among
African and white women using matched data from the 2001 Population Census and the South
African Labour Force Surveys. We show that among both white and African women, simple
sex ratios, which capture the quantity of unmarried men relative to women in local marriage
markets, are signiﬁcant predictors of marriage. However, among African women, economic-based
measures of “marriageability”, which take into account the quality of available men, perform
even better in predicting marriage. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the argument that the
payment of bridewealth (or ilobolo) by a husband to the prospective wife’s family acts as a
ﬁnancial constraint to marriage among African couples, raising the “marriageability” criteria of
men.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Marriage rates in South Africa are signiﬁcantly lower among African1 w o m e nt h a na m o n gw h i t e
women. In 2003, for example, white women aged 20 to 34 were more than twice as likely as African
women in the same age cohort to be married. Large racial diﬀerences in marriage rates also have
been documented for the United States. A key hypothesis that has been tested in this literature is
that these diﬀerences in marriage rates reﬂect diﬀerences in the pools of “marriageable” men, where
following Wilson (1987), “marriageability” is identiﬁed not only by the marital status of men but
also by their economic status (cf. Wood 1995, Brien 1997, Angrist 2000).
South Africa oﬀers a particularly interesting opportunity to explore the relationship between
marriage markets and marriage outcomes. First, signiﬁcant racial disparities in labour market op-
portunities persist in post-apartheid South Africa - unemployment rates are markedly higher among
African men than among white men, and earnings remain signiﬁcantly lower. Racial diﬀerences in
sex ratios which incorporate the economic status of men are therefore far more pronounced than
diﬀerences in simple sex ratios. Second, in many African marriages, bridewealth (or ilobolo)i sp a i d
by the prospective husband to his wife’s family to validate the marriage. This payment, which is
considerably larger than the mean monthly earnings of African men (Casale and Posel 2009), sug-
gests that economic status may be particularly important in identifying the marriageable pool of
African men. It is plausible therefore that low marriage rates among African women reﬂect not so
much a shortage of available (unmarried) African men, but a shortage of “marriageable” men.
∗The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions.
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1The term African is used to describe black South Africans who make up the majority of the population (approx-
imately eighty percent).
1In this paper, we investigate the large racial diﬀerences in marriage rates in South Africa. In
particular, we test whether economic-based measures of “marriageability”, which take into account
the quality of available men, perform better in predicting marriage than simple sex ratios, which
capture only the quantity of unmarried men relative to women in local marriage markets. Alternative
measures of sex ratios, which diﬀer according to how the marriageable pool of men is identiﬁed, are
generated using the 2001 Population Census (the most recently released census in South Africa).
To approximate the local marriage market better, sex ratios are estimated at the district level
and these district sex ratios are then matched to the 2003 Labour Force Survey (LFS). We use
the matched data on the samples of young African and white women to run both individual-level
regressions, which estimate the probability of marriage, and district-level regressions, which estimate
the average relationship between district sex ratios and district marriage rates.
Our estimations show that the probability of marriage among young African women is positively
and signiﬁcantly related to the local pool of unmarried African men, but that the eﬀect is strongest
where these men are employed and earning incomes above a certain threshold. Consistent with the
view that ilobolo raises the “marriageability” criteria we ﬁnd that these results are even stronger in
the province of KwaZulu-Natal, which contains the largest Zulu-speaking population in the country,
and where the practice of paying bridewealth is most common. In contrast, there is only weak
evidence to link the “marriageability” of white men according to their economic status to the prob-
ability of marriage among young white women. Estimations at the district level produce consistent
results for Africans, but small and insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for whites, partly because of sample size
restrictions at the district level.
We test the robustness of our ﬁndings to diﬀerent samples, speciﬁcations and data. The study
looks speciﬁcally at a cohort of young women aged 20 to 34, and a corresponding cohort of men aged
23 to 37. However, we show that our results remain robust for an extended age cohort of women aged
20 to 39 (and men aged 23 to 42). Our ﬁndings are robust also to controls for possible migration
eﬀects and to alternative measures of the economic status of men. By matching 2001 Census data
on sex ratios to 2003 LFS data, we have assumed a two-year lag between the pool of marriageable
men relative to women and marriage-market outcomes. However the estimates remain consistent,
particularly for Africans, when the 2001 district sex ratios are matched to 2002 LFS data and 2004
LFS data.
In the next section, we review the literature on sex ratios and marriage rates, and we outline
speciﬁc characteristics of marriage markets and labour markets in South Africa. Section 3 describes
the data and methods used in the study and in Section 4, the main estimations using the 2003 LFS
data are presented. In Section 5, we report on a range of sensitivity tests undertaken and in the last
section we summarise the key empirical ﬁndings of the study.
2 Literature review: Marriage rates and sex ratios
In standard economic theory, the event of marriage has been explained as a match in the marriage
market between prospective partners, where for both partners the utility of being married outweighs
the utility of remaining single, and the gains from marriage are typically understood as deriving from
the specialisation of labour within the household (Becker 1973; 1981). In the context of incomplete
information in the marriage market, individuals engage in a costly search process to ﬁnd a suitable
marriage partner, conceptually similar to the job search process in the labour market (Lichter et al
1992; Wood 1995; Brien and Sheran 2003).
One of the factors aﬀecting the probability of marriage is the availability of potential marriage
partners with suitable characteristics in local marriage markets (Lichter et al 1992; Wood 1995). A
large supply of suitable potential spouses will reduce the cost of search for a marriage partner and
increase the potential beneﬁts from marriage. For each individual, the suitability or “marriageabil-
ity” of potential partners is judged against what has been referred to as the “reservation quality
2partner” (Lichter et al 1992), a partner that has some minimum level of characteristics without
which the marriage oﬀer will not be accepted.
In addition to certain demographic characteristics such as age and race, the economic attractive-
ness of potential male partners is one of the qualities commonly assumed to determine the reservation
partner for women. Women may only consider marrying men who have achieved a “minimum ac-
ceptable level of current labo[u]r market success” (Wood 1995: 165), as this success provides some
indication of a man’s future earnings potential. This means that a woman’s reservation oﬀer in the
marriage market may be sticky downwards — even if marriage markets do not clear, women will not
accept marriage oﬀers from men who do not meet some minimum criterion.
This idea was embodied in Wilson’s (1987) “male marriageable pool” hypothesis, that the large
decline in marriage rates among African Americans in the United States was being driven by the
deterioration in economic circumstances among this group of men, and consequently a shrinking
supply of marriageable young men available for young African American women (in contrast to their
white counterparts) (see also Charles and Luoh 2005). Wilson (1987) deﬁned “marriageability” in
terms of the employment status of available men (relative to available women) but other studies have
subsequently investigated the concept of “marriageability” in more depth to include the quality of
employment or some minimum level of earnings (Lichter et al 1992; Wood 1995; Brien 1997).
The empirical evidence from this literature is mixed. The results suggest that measures of
economic attractiveness of potential male partners (and particularly income-based measures) are
strong predictors of marriage among African Americans, but not among whites. However, the
declining “marriageability” of African American men seems to be responsible for only a small portion
of the decline in marriage rates over time, once other factors have been controlled for.
In South Africa, the large racial diﬀerences in marriage rates typically have been explained by
the ravaging eﬀects of apartheid policies, which impinged on almost every aspect of the social,
political and economic life of Africans. Studies on family formation in South Africa have pointed
to the devastating impact of restrictions on the free movement of Africans, where the majority
of the population was forced into crowded homeland areas and movement to urban areas to work
was strictly regulated (see Hosegood et al 2009 for a comprehensive review). Men predominantly
migrated for periods of work, while women remained in rural areas with children, creating both
emotional and ﬁnancial instability within marriage. Hosegood et al, 2009 also highlight the negative
eﬀect that this had on attitudes towards the institution of marriage, reinforced by the general
acceptance of non-marital childbearing among Africans.
Although geographic restrictions on permanent residence were dismantled in the late 1980s,
marriage rates remain low and have continued to decline in the post-apartheid era, particularly
among Africans. In this study we seek to add to the literature by exploring whether economic
conditions can be linked to marriage rates in South Africa. Due to discriminatory practices in the
South African labour market during the decades of apartheid, reinforced by lacklustre employment
growth in the post-apartheid period (cf. Casale et al 2004; Bhorat 2006), African men are much
more likely to be unemployed. Among the employed, African men are far less likely to work in
stable, high-earning jobs, than white men. Data from the 2001 Population Census suggest that
among young African men, unemployment rates are 10 times larger than among young white men,
and that on average they earn only a quarter of what white men earn. The pool of marriageable men
available to young African women therefore is considerably smaller than for white women. In terms
of the theoretical framework presented above, a large imbalance between the demand for and supply
of marriageable men means that some proportion of women participating in the marriage market
will not get married. We would therefore expect the availability of marriageable men, deﬁned in
terms of their economic performance, to be an important reason why marriage rates are far lower
among African women than among white women.
An additional reason why we would expect economic status to inﬂuence the “marriageability”
particularly of African men, concerns the traditional practice of ilobolo, the payment of bridewealth
by the prospective groom to the bride’s family to validate the marriage. The limited quantitative
3data that exist on ilobolo in South Africa suggest that the practice is still widespread and that the
payment remains substantial (in the region of over a year’s worth of average earnings for African
men), despite the inadequate economic opportunities facing this group of men.2 For African women,
the requirement of a ﬁnancially suitable marriage partner may be driven not just by the expectation
for the male to be the primary breadwinner or at least a signiﬁcant contributor to household economic
resources, but further by the need for the man to aﬀord ilobolo. The payment of bridewealth would
reinforce the “rigidity” in the marriage market referred to above; in this case a woman’s reservation
oﬀer would also be based on the ability of the potential partner to pay ilobolo.
Earlier ethnographic research in South Africa has also made reference to the added ﬁnancial
pressures of ilobolo on the prospects of marriage (Hunter 2004; Hosegood et al 2009). This research
has focused mostly on marriage traditions in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, which is home to the
largest Zulu-speaking population and where ilobolo is practiced widely. Here marriage rates are the
lowest in the country and rates of non-marital childbearing are among the highest. Research in this
area also suggests that the practice and value of ilobolo are largely inﬂexible.3 We therefore explore
whether the relationship between the “marriageability” of available men and marriage among young
African women is particularly strong in KwaZulu-Natal.
3D a t a a n d m e t h o d s
To investigate marriage markets in South Africa, we analyse samples of young African and white
women (aged 20 to 34 years), drawn from the nationally representative LFS. These household surveys
have been conducted biannually in South Africa since 2000. We consider speciﬁcally the September
2003 round of the survey (LFS 2003:2), although we show later that our results remain robust also
for samples drawn from the September 2002 and March 2004 rounds (the LFS 2002:2 and LFS 2004:1
respectively).
Figure 1 describes large diﬀerences in marriage rates4 among young African and white women
in 2003. White women are signiﬁcantly more likely than African women to be married and the gap
in marriage rates remains large even as age increases. These diﬀerences are not simply the result of
racial diﬀerences in the timing of marriage. Although marriage rates increase among older cohorts of
African women, they remain signiﬁcantly lower than marriage rates among white women. In 2003,
only three percent of white women older than ﬁfty had never been married, compared to 13 percent
of African women in the same age cohort.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Marriage outcomes in 2003 are likely to reﬂect the nature of the marriage market, or the relative
availability of male partners, over some period prior to 2003 rather than in that same year. We
therefore use lagged sex ratios, generated from the 2001 Population Census data. The Census
data have the advantage over household survey data of providing larger sample sizes at high levels
2There is no information collected on the payment of ilobolo in national household surveys in South
Africa.Information collected in the 1998 wave of a regionally based panel study (the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dy-
namics Study), gives some indication of the extent to which ilobolo is still practiced, and its value. Of the married
respondents aged 60 years or younger, three quarters reported making ilobolo payments with marriage. The average
value of ilobolo reported for people married from 1985 to 1998 was approximately 20 000 Rands in 2000 prices, or
almost 13 times the average monthly real earnings of black men in the 1998 sample (Casale and Posel 2009). This
value is consistent with reports in other literature of ilobolo t y p i c a l l yr a n g i n gf r o m1 00 0 0R a n d st o2 50 0 0R a n d s
(Kaarsholm 2005, Gustafsson and Worku 2006).
3Hosegood et al (2009: 284) write: “The legacy of the early Natal administrators is that they co-opted and codiﬁed
bridewealth. While historically the amount of bridewealth was negotiated by the families involved and was rarely paid
in full before the marriage took place, the Natal code subjected Zulu women to a ﬁxed and very high bridewealth of
eleven head of cattle or their equivalent value.”
4The Labour Force Surveys from March 2000 to March 2004 do not distinguish between marriage and cohabitation.
Consequently, our measures will overstate the true marriage rate, and because cohabitation rates are typically higher
among African women than among white women (Budlender et al 2004), the diﬀerence between white and African
marriage rates will be underestimated.
4of disaggregation, thereby oﬀering more reliable sex ratio measures than those which would be
generated using the LFS data. Because marriage markets are still racially segregated, we construct
separate sex ratios for whites and Africans. To better approximate the local marriage market, we
estimate sex ratios at the district level, across the 53 district council and metropolitan areas in South
Africa.
We assume that men tend to marry women typically who are up to three years younger, so that
the sample of unmarried women aged 20 to 34 corresponds to the sample of unmarried men aged
23 to 37 years.5 We then identify four district sex ratios which diﬀer according to how the pool of
marriageable men is deﬁned. The ﬁrst sex ratio (S1) is simply the ratio of all unmarried men (23
to 37 years) to unmarried women (20 to 34 years).6 In the second ratio (S2),w er e s t r i c tt h ep o o l
o fu n m a r r i e dm e nt oo n l yt h o s em e nw i t he m p l o y m e n t .I nt h et h i r da n df o u r t hr a t i o s( S 3 and S4),
male “marriageability” is identiﬁed according to the earnings of employed men. We distinguish a
lower threshold at median earnings for the male cohort so that S3 includes only those unmarried
men with at least median earnings, and an upper threshold at mean earnings (for S4).7
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 1 describes the average values of these district sex ratios for young Africans and whites in
the 2001 Population Census. For both Africans and whites, sex ratios fall as the “marriageability”
criteria increase. However, the fall is particularly dramatic for Africans. Although simple sex ratios
are signiﬁcantly higher for whites than for Africans, the diﬀerence is far larger when the ratios
incorporate the economic status of potential male partners. The pool of marriageable men, relative
to women, is approximately three-fold smaller for young African women than young white women.
This large divergence in economic-based sex ratios reﬂects substantial diﬀerences in unemployment
rates among young African and white men: in the 2001 Census, just over 50 percent of young African
men were unemployed according to the expanded deﬁnition of unemployment (which includes the
non-searching unemployed), compared to only ﬁve percent of young white men.
To test the relationship between the diﬀerent sex ratios and marriage outcomes, we match the
district sex ratios to the 2003 LFS data.8 A large degree of racial segregation remains in residential
living arrangements in South Africa, and whites in particular are heavily concentrated in a small
number of districts, primarily in the metropolitan areas. Consequently, although the LFS sampled
approximately 27 000 households (or 98 747 individuals), sample sizes particularly of young white
women are very low in a large number of districts. In estimating marriage outcomes, we exclude all
districts for which there are fewer than 10 young women in the sub-sample: of the 53 districts, we
can identify marriage rates in 25 districts for whites and 51 districts for Africans.9
The ﬁrst set of regressions estimates the probability of marriage among young women:
Pr(Mi =1 | SkXi) (1)
5We do not have data on age at ﬁrst marriage in either the 2001 Population Census or the LFS data. Some
US studies have used a two-year age gap to estimate sex ratios (Lichter et al 1992; Angrist 2002). Using national
administrative data for South Africa in 1997, Statistics South Africa estimated the average age at ﬁrst marriage to
be 30 years for women and 34 years for men (Statistics South Africa 2000).
6It is possible that men who are in polygamous marriages will be considered part of the potential set of partners
available to unmarried women. However, a negligible percentage of African men (0.14 percent) in the age group 23 to
37 years report being involved in polygamous marriages in the 2001 Population Census. We therefore do not adjust
the sex ratio to reﬂect the potential availability of these men.
7Point values for earnings were not collected in the 2001 Population Census; instead, income was collected in
bracket responses. To identify median and mean earnings, we estimated these values for the sample of unmarried
young men in the September 2001 LFS, and then matched the estimates to the closest applicable income bracket in
the Census. Because of a skewed earnings distribution in South Africa, mean earnings lie in a higher earnings bracket
than median earnings, and given the legacy of racial segregation in the labour market, mean and median earnings for
young white men are signiﬁcantly higher than those for young African men.
8Mathews Phiri from Statistics South Africa kindly provided us with the information necessary to identify district
councils and metropolitan areas in the LFS 2003 for comparability with the Census 2001.
9This resulted in the loss of six out of 9 855 observations in the African sample of women aged 20 to 34 years and
83 out of 914 observations in the white sample of young women.
5where Mi represents woman i’s current marital status (married or not), Sk captures the lagged sex
ratio of the district k in which the woman resides; and Xi, represents a set of individual characteristics
including a quadratic in age, education, location (whether living in an urban or rural area) and
language spoken most often at home.10 Separate probit regressions are estimated for African and
white women, and for each of the four sex ratios.
If sex ratios approximate the marriage market, then we would expect the probability that a
woman is married to be larger in districts where the sex ratio is higher. However, if the pool of
men available for marriage depends also on the quality of these men, then sex ratios which capture
economic status should be better predictors of marriage than simple sex ratios. Given the practice
of bridewealth payment in South Africa, we would expect a stronger relationship between economic-
based measures of “marriageability” and marriage outcomes particularly among African women:
only those men who can aﬀord ilobolo can enter the marriage market.
In the second set of regressions, we use ordinary least squares to estimate the relationship between
marriage rates and sex ratios at the district level:
Mk = f(Sk,X k) (2)
where for k districts, Mk is the marriage rate (the proportion of women aged 20 to 34 who are
married), Sk is the lagged district sex ratio, and Xk are district characteristics, including the average
age of young women in the district, their average years of schooling, the proportion of young women
in the district by language spoken at home, and the proportion of young women in the district
l o c a t e di na nu r b a na r e a .
In the remaining estimations, we test the robustness of our results by running a number of
sensitivity tests. First, we test whether our results are robust to possible migration eﬀects. In
identifying an individual’s marriage market, we used the individual’s district of residence, i.e. sex
ratios are deﬁned in terms of “resident” men and women, where the requirement for residency is
that the individual stays in the household for at least four nights on average per week. A possible
concern with our study is if unmarried male migrants participate in marriage markets at their
district of origin, then sex ratios may underestimate the availability of men in districts from which
migration occurs (and overestimate the availability of men in destination areas). In the absence of
data on labour migration in the 2001 Census, we use a module on migrant workers11 included in the
September LFS 2003 to estimate the ratio of unmarried male migrants to unmarried female migrants
at the district level. We construct a migration index, identifying districts with low, medium and
high unmarried male to female migration, which we include in the probit estimations.
Second, we consider alternative age restrictions for the samples of young women and men, as well
as slightly modiﬁed deﬁnitions of the sex ratios. More speciﬁcally, we test whether our results remain
robust for an extended age cohort of women aged 20 to 39 years (and men aged 23 to 42 years),
and when we restrict economic-based measures of marriageable males to men with formal (non-
farming) employment. Formal sector employment,12 which tends to be more secure than informal
sector employment, may oﬀer a better indication of a man’s future economic status and therefore
his “marriageability”.
Third, we investigate whether the relationship between marriage rates and sex ratios estimated
for the September 2003 LFS, holds also for the September 2002 LFS and the March 2004 LFS.
A ﬁnal concern with our estimations is potential endogeneity in the measure of marriageable
men (Wood 1995). For example, if earnings are a function of marriage, then low marriage rates may
explain why the pool of marriageable men, or higher-earning unmarried men, is so small. We do
not have suitable instruments to control for this endogeneity in our estimations. However, research
10The mean and standard errors of the explanatory variables are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.
11A migrant worker is deﬁned as an individual who is reported as a member of the household but who is not resident
in the household and is away for at least a month each year to work or to look for work.
12Formal sector employment here is based on a question in the Census 2001, which allows the respondent the follow-
ing three options: ‘formal registered (non-farming)’, ‘informal unregistered (non-farming)’ and ‘farming’ employment.
6on the male marital earnings premium in South Africa suggests that the marriage premium among
African men derives from strong selection eﬀects into marriage, rather than from the eﬀects of
marriage itself (Casale and Posel 2009). These ﬁndings suggest that only higher-earning men are
able to aﬀord marriage, which would also be consistent with the argument that ilobolo acts as a
constraint to marriage.
4R e s u l t s
The results for the ﬁrst set of regressions, which estimate the probability of marriage among young
women aged 20 to 34 years, are reported in Tables 2a and 2b.13 For both Africans and whites, the
simple lagged sex ratio (S1)is a signiﬁcant predictor of the probability of marriage among young
women. However, among African women, sex ratios which incorporate the economic status of men
are consistently stronger predictors. The largest eﬀect comes from the sex ratio which deﬁnes the
male marriageable pool as men with earnings in excess of the average earnings of their cohort (S4).
The marginal eﬀects calculated at the mean suggest a one percent increase in S1 would increase
the probability of marriage by 26 percent, while a corresponding increase in S4 would increase the
probability of marriage by approximately 72 percent.14 A m o n gw h i t e s ,t h e r ei sl e s sc o n v i n c i n g
evidence that economic-based sex ratios perform better in explaining diﬀerences in the probability
of marriage than the simple sex ratio. The coeﬃcients for S1,S 2 and S3 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from each other, and S4 is not signiﬁcant in the regression.
[Insert Tables 2a and 2b about here]
A possible explanation for why the probability of marriage increases dramatically among African
women (and not among white women) when the pool of higher-earning unmarried men increases,
concerns the practice of bridewealth. Because ilobolo is a sizeable payment, the “marriageabil-
ity” criteria for African men may be more stringent, and only higher-earning men who can aﬀord
bridewealth payments are considered marriageable.
The tables also describe other racial diﬀerences in the determinants of marriage. For both African
and white women, the probability of marriage increases with age, but the eﬀect is much stronger
for white women. At age 34, almost 90 percent of young white women are married, compared
to only 48 percent of young African women. Whereas educational attainment seems to have no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of marriage among white women, the probability of marriage
decreases signiﬁcantly as educational levels among African women rise. Compared to a woman with
similar observed characteristics, possession of completed secondary (or higher) education reduces
the probability of marriage by between 14 and 17 percent relative to having no schooling. Higher
education would increase a woman’s “reservation oﬀer” in the marriage market, as it increases her
employment opportunities and therefore the utility of being single.
The probability of marriage also diﬀers signiﬁcantly among women according to the language
spoken most at home. In comparison to white women who report Afrikaans as their home language,
English-speaking white women have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of marriage. Among African
women, the probability of marriage is signiﬁcantly smaller among those who report their home
language as Ndebele, Xhosa, Zulu, Northern Sotho or Tswana — languages which correspond to
ethnic groups where the payment of bridewealth is practiced.
In Table 3, we repeat the probit regressions for African women but we restrict the sample to
women living in KwaZulu-Natal. KwaZulu-Natal is a province in which the majority of Africans
are Zulu-speakers who live in rural areas (in 2003, approximately 94 percent of all young African
women in the province were Zulu-speakers, more than 60 percent of whom were rural-dwellers),
and where the practice of bridewealth is relatively more widespread (Hosegood et al 2009). It is
13All the results in the individual regressions are robust to the correction of the standard errors for clustering at
the level of the primary sampling unit.
14The marginal eﬀects for the regressions in Tables 2a and 2b for Africans and whites are reported in Table A2 in
the Appendix.
7also the province in South Africa in which marriage rates among young African women are lowest:
in 2003, only 19 percent of all young African women in KwaZulu-Natal were married compared
to the national average of 30 percent.15 Table 3 shows that the probability of marriage among
African women in KwaZulu-Natal increases dramatically in districts where the pool of unmarried,
higher-earning men is relatively larger. These results are clearly consistent with the argument that
bridewealth payments are a ﬁnancial constraint to marriage, raising the “marriageability” criteria
for men.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
We also estimate the relationship between sex ratios and marriage outcomes (in this case marriage
rates) at the district level. The estimated coeﬃcients for the four sex ratios are reported in Table
4. For Africans, the pattern is consistent with estimations at the individual level. Sex ratios
which capture the economic status of men, particularly in terms of their earnings, perform better
in predicting district marriage rates than simple sex ratios. The results for whites, however, are
noisy and insigniﬁcant, perhaps partly because of the small number of districts for which we have
suﬃcient observations to generate sex ratios and marriage rates.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
5 Sensitivity tests
Our ﬁndings from both the individual-level and district-level regressions suggest that marriage out-
comes among young African women are inﬂuenced more by the “quality” or economic status of
unmarried men than by simply the number of unmarried men. Among white women, however, there
is no clear evidence that economic-based measures of “marriageability” are stronger predictors of
marriage outcomes. In this section, we test the robustness of our ﬁndings to a range of sensitivity
tests.
First, we control for the possible eﬀects of labour migration on marriage outcomes. If men who
are labour migrants participate in marriage markets in their district of origin,16 then sex ratios, which
are calculated for resident individuals, will underestimate the pool of marriageable men in areas from
which this migration occurs. To control for migration eﬀects, we include two dummy variables in the
probit estimations, representing districts with “medium” and “high” migration ratios, with “low”
migration as the base category. The migration ratios are calculated as the ratio of unmarried male
labour migrants to unmarried female labour migrants in the district.17 Because very few whites are
reported as labour migrants, we generate the migration variables only for the African sample.
Table 5 reports the results of these probit regressions. The migration coeﬃcients are negative,
suggesting that for women living in districts with higher relative male labour migration, the probabil-
ity of marriage is lower, but the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant. The eﬀects of the sex ratio variables,
however, remain signiﬁcant and consistent with earlier estimations: the probability of marriage for
young African women increases as the economic status of available men increases, and particularly
when there is a larger pool of higher-earning unmarried men.
Second, we test the relationship between sex ratios and marriage outcomes when we extend the
upper age threshold for women to 39 years (and to 42 years for men), and when we restrict the
“marriageability” criteria in the economic-based sex ratios (S2 to S4) t om e nw i t hf o r m a ls e c t o r
employment. The coeﬃcients for both the individual-level and district-level regressions are reported
in Table 6.
15The next lowest marriage rates by province were in the Eastern Cape and North West province, where 26 percent
of African women in the 20 to 34 age cohort were married.
16A key impetus for labour migration historically was for men to generate income needed for ilobolo payments to
marry women who typically resided in their communities of origin (Hunter 2004).
17This index is calculated using the LFS 2003:2 data as there is no information on migration in the 2001 Population
Census (or in the 2001 LFS ).The LFSs which include a migration module do not collect information on the age of
the migrant worker, and we therefore could not identify a ratio of young migrants speciﬁcally.
8[Insert Table 5 about here]
The sex ratio coeﬃcients remain large and signiﬁcant throughout for the African sample, and the
patterns are consistent across both the individual-level and district-level regressions. The results for
whites are also largely unchanged: in the individual regressions, simple sex ratios perform as well
in predicting marriage outcomes as sex ratios which reﬂect men’s economic status; and estimates
for the district regressions remain noisy and insigniﬁcant. For the African sample, the estimated
coeﬃcients on the sex ratio variables are generally lower in the regressions with the extended age
range, indicating perhaps that when a wider deﬁnition of the relevant marriage market is used, the
relationship between sex ratios and marriage is diluted.18 When the marriageable pool includes only
men with formal sector employment for ratios S2 to S4,t h ec o e ﬃcients are somewhat larger. This
is expected if having formal-sector employment is considered a more desirable attribute, as it oﬀers
greater job security and probably better future potential earnings than informal-sector employment.
[Insert table 6 about here]
In the ﬁnal set of tests, we considered alternative lags for our sex ratio variables, by matching
the 2001 district sex ratios to samples drawn from the LFS 2002:2 and the LFS 2004:1. The results,
described in Table 7, show that sex-ratio eﬀects remain largely consistent, sizeable and signiﬁcant for
Africans in both years, although the coeﬃcients are clearly smaller in 2002. Among white women,
the results are noisy and none of the sex ratio variables remains signiﬁcant even in the individual-level
regressions.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we investigated the relationship between marriage and the availability of suitable or
marriageable partners among African and white wom e ni nS o u t hA f r i c a . I np a r t i c u l a r ,w et e s t e d
whether economic-based measures of “marriageability”, which take into account the quality of avail-
able men, perform better in predicting marriage than simple sex ratios, which capture only the
quantity of available men.
For young African women, the probability of marriage is positively and signiﬁcantly related to the
local pool of unmarried African men, but the eﬀect is far stronger where these men are employed with
earnings above a certain threshold (and particularly the mean for their cohort). One explanation that
is consistent with these ﬁndings is that bridewealth raises the “marriageability” criteria for African
men; only men who can aﬀord to pay ilobolo are considered “marriageable”. Further evidence is
provided in the stronger results we ﬁnd for the province of KwaZulu-Natal, where the custom of
bridewealth is most strictly observed. In contrast, among the sample of young white women, simple
sex ratios perform as well in predicting marriage as measures which take into account the economic
attractiveness of white men.
These results suggest that part of the reason why marriage rates are much lower among African
women is because the economic status of men matters more for their “marriageability”. At the same
time, the supply of marriageable men is small given high unemployment rates and relatively low
earnings among a majority of employed African men. This mismatch in the marriage market for
Africans should imply that the value of ilobolo falls, reducing women’s reservation oﬀer and making
it easier for men to marry. However, this research supports the view that bridewealth is relatively
inﬂexible in South Africa and therefore acts a key constraint to marriage among Africans.
18Although not shown here, the results from the set of regressions for a narrower age range of 20 to 29 years for
women (and 23 to 32 years for men) are consistent with this pattern for the African sample. The regressions results
for Whites are not considered reliable as the sample size was reduced substantially with the exclusion of additional
districts with less than 10 observations.
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Table A1. Individual characteristics of young women aged 20 to 34 years, 2003 
 














































Northern Sotho  0.113 
(0.004) 
-- 




















Unweighted sample size  9,849  831 
Source: LFS 2003:2 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. All districts for which there are less than ten 
observations to generate a sex ratio or a marriage rate have been excluded.   
 
13Table A2. The probability of marriage and sex ratios among African and white women 
aged 20 to 34 years, 2003, marginal effects 
 
 AFRICAN  WHITE 
  I II  III  IV I II  III  IV 
S1  
(all unmarried men)  0.259 --  --  -- 0.248 --  --  -- 
S2  
(unmarried employed men)  -- 0.301 --  --  -- 0.215 --  -- 
S3 (unmarried men with at 
least median earnings)  -- --  0.319  -- -- --  0.251  -- 
S4 (unmarried men with at 
least average earnings)  -- -- --  0.721  -- -- --  0.123 
Age  0.129 0.128 0.129 0.129 0.308 0.307 0.308 0.309 
Age
2  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
Grade 1 – grade 7  -0.044 -0.040 -0.039 -0.043 0.271  0.267  0.265  0.263 
Grade 8 – grade 11  -0.110 -0.104 -0.105 -0.108 0.170  0.159  0.154  0.155 
Grade 12 (matric)  -0.177 -0.172 -0.173 -0.176 0.108  0.093  0.088  0.089 
Tertiary  -0.152 -0.149 -0.151 -0.153 0.170  0.154  0.145  0.146 
Urban  -0.016 -0.010 -0.005 -0.008 -0.164 -0.169 -0.182 -0.192 
English  0.040 0.063 0.033 0.040 -0.052  -0.056  -0.065  -0.056 
Ndebele  -0.138 -0.132 -0.144 -0.142  -- -- -- -- 
Xhosa  -0.132 -0.106 -0.133 -0.128  -- -- -- -- 
Zulu  -0.157 -0.141 -0.163 -0.161  -- -- -- -- 
Northern Sotho  -0.095 -0.081 -0.100 -0.099  -- -- -- -- 
Southern Sotho  -0.073 -0.048 -0.065 -0.062  -- -- -- -- 
Tswana  -0.162 -0.152 -0.166 -0.154  -- -- -- -- 
Swazi  -0.048 -0.052 -0.050 -0.041  -- -- -- -- 
Venda  0.076 0.097 0.064 0.065  -- -- -- -- 
Tsonga  0.009 0.030 0.004 0.004  -- -- -- -- 
Other language  0.073 0.114 0.079 0.080  -- -- -- -- 
Unweighted  sample  size  9,849 9,849 9,849 9,849  831  831  831  831 
Source: LFS 2003:2 
14Table 1. District sex ratios among Africans and whites, 2001 
 
  Africans Whites 




S2 = Σ (unmarried men with employment)/  





S3 = Σ (unmarried employed men with at least  median 





S4 = Σ (unmarried employed men with at least average 





Source: South African Population Census 2001 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. All means are significantly different at a 99 
percent confidence level. 
Monthly median earnings (in 2001 prices) for S3 are estimated at 801 Rands and 5 201 Rands for African and 
white men respectively; and monthly average earnings for S4 are estimated at 1 601 Rands and 6 401 Rands for 
African and white men respectively. 
For whites, three districts with less than ten observations for unmarried young men and women have been 
excluded, and one outlier district with a simple sex ratio of over 120 has also been excluded. 
 
15Table 2a. The probability of marriage and sex ratios, African women aged 20 to 34 
years, 2003 
 
 I  II  III  IV 
S1  
(all unmarried men) 
0.986*** 
(0.137) 
-- -- -- 
S2  




S3 (unmarried men with at 
least median earnings) 
-- --  1.238*** 
(0.204) 
-- 
S4 (unmarried men with at 
least average earnings) 



















































































































































F statistic   37.07  36.49  36.28  35.99 
Unweighted sample size  9,849  9,849  9,849  9,849 
Source: LFS 2003:2 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 99 percent confidence 
level. ** Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. * Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
The omitted educational category is no schooling; the omitted language is Afrikaans. 
17Table 2b. The probability of marriage and sex ratios, white women aged 20 to 34 years, 
2003 
 
 I  II  III  IV 
S1 (all unmarried men)  0.926** 
(0.384) 
-- -- -- 





S3 (unmarried men with at 
least median earnings) 
-- --  1.017* 
(0.571) 
-- 
S4 (unmarried men with at 
least average earnings) 



































































F  statistic    14.25 14.20 14.47 13.68 
Unweighted sample size  831  831  831  831 
Source: LFS 2003:2 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 99 percent confidence 
level. ** Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. * Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
The omitted educational category is no schooling and the omitted language is Afrikaans. 
18Table 3. The probability of marriage and sex ratios, African women aged 20 to 34 years 
living in KwaZulu-Natal, 2003 
 
 Coefficient 
S1 (all unmarried men)  0.343 
(0.512) 
S2 (unmarried employed men)  0.876 
(0.728) 
S3 (unmarried men with at least median earnings)  2.513*** 
(0.893) 
S4 (unmarried men with at least average earnings)  5.871*** 
(2.138) 
Unweighted sample size  1,984 
Source: LFS 2003:2 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 99 percent confidence 
level. The probit regressions include the same set of independent variables as that reported in Table 2a.   
 
 
19Table 4. Marriage rates and sex ratios by district, 2003 
 
























Source: LFS 2003:2 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 99 percent confidence level. ** 
Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The sample includes all women aged 20 – 34 years. The 
regressions also include weighted district-level variables for age, years of schooling, location (urban or rural) 
and language spoken.  
 
20Table 5. The probability of marriage and sex ratios with migration effects, African 
women aged 20 to 34 years, 2003 
 I  II  III  IV 
S1 1.002*** 
(0.139) 
-- -- -- 
S2 --  1.098*** 
(0.172) 
-- -- 
S3 --  --  1.253*** 
(0.207) 
-- 
S4  -- -- --  2.787*** 
(0.472) 
















F  statistic    33.62 32.96 32.80 32.58 
Unweighted sample size  9,849  9,849  9,849  9,849 
Source: LFS 2003:2 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 99 percent confidence 
level. The migration ratio is calculated as the district ratio of unmarried male labour migrants to unmarried 
female labour migrants. A low migration ratio is the omitted variable. The probit regressions also include the 
same set of independent variables as that reported in Table 2a.   
21Table 6. Marriage and sex ratios: sensitivity tests for age and economic status, 2003 








  Extended age range (20 – 39 years) 
Individual-level regressions      
















District-level regressions      
















  Redefining sex ratios – formal employment 
Individual-level regressions      
















District-level regressions      
















Source: LFS 2003:2 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 99 percent confidence 
level. ** Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. * Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The 
regressions include a full set of independent variables specified in Tables 2a and 2b for the individual-level 
regressions and in Table 4 for the district-level regressions.  
22Table 7. Marriage and sex ratios, using data from 2002 and 2004 








 LFS  2002:2 
Individual-level regressions      
















District-level regressions      
















 LFS  2004:1 
Individual-level regressions      
















District-level regressions      
















Source: LFS 2002:2 and LFS 2004:1. 
Notes: The data are weighted. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at the 99 percent confidence 
level. ** Significant at the 95 percent confidence level. * Significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The 
regressions include a full set of independent variables specified in Tables 2a and 2b for the individual-level 
regressions and in Table 4 for the district-level regressions.  
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White %  married 
Age












Figure 1. Marriage rates among African and white women aged 20-34 years, 
2003   
                     Source: LFS 2003:2. 
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